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FUNCTIONAL INTEREST ADVOCACY IN
MODERN COMPLEX LITIGATION
TIMOTHY WILTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Before a court enters an order affecting an individual, it should hear
the arguments of that individual or his representative. Such a proposi-
tion is hardly novel; it is a simple statement of due process require-
ments.' In modem complex litigation, however, courts frequently enter
orders affecting individuals who have not had their views heard, even
through a representative.
In a typical school desegregation case, for example, the remedy re-
quires massive changes in the lives of students, parents, teachers, ad-
ministrators, and school board members. It is unlikely, however, that
the judge heard the views of more than a handful of these individuals
before he entered his final order. The judge heard, instead, from two
lawyers. One lawyer purportedly represented the view of the school
board, although in reality he probably advocated a combination of his
own views and the views of the people in the school system with whom
he had the most contact, the top administrators or the majority of the
school board.2 The other lawyer purportedly represented the view of
the class of black parents and children, although in reality he probably
advocated a combination of his own views, those of the organization
that sponsored the litigation, and those of the class representatives It
is unlikely that all of the other affected individuals had views identical
to those held by the people actually represented in the litigation. To
the extent their interests differed, a judicial order affecting them was
entered without their arguments being heard.
Ensuring that all affected individuals have their views heard is an
extremely important aspect of our legal process. In addition to instinc-
tive notions of fairness, there are at least two practical reasons why the
* Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University. B.A., 1968, J.D., 1971, LL.M., 1977,
Harvard University.
1. U.S. CONST. amend XIV. See generally Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
2. See text accompanying notes 70-72 & 89-93 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 80-88 infra.
Washington University Open Scholarship
38 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
judge should maximize involvement of affected individuals. First, the
judge's decision is more likely to be correct if he is aware of all the
information and arguments from all the points of view.4 Second, the
people who must comply with the order will be more likely to do so if
they know their views have been heard.
For these reasons, the adversary system of litigation is designed to
include representation of all affected individuals. In theory, the af-
fected individuals are all formal parties, and each party is represented
by a lawyer whose duty is to advocate vigorously for that party's posi-
tion.6 The lawyer is charged to consider no other interests, be they his
own, other people's or the public's. His loyalty must be unswerving.7
He must present the facts and argue the law in a way most favorable to
his client.' In this way the judge is presented with all the information
and arguments from all the affected individuals. This theory of the
adversary system is based on simple private lawsuits, however, and
fails to ensure adequate representation when formalistically applied to
modem complex public litigation. Such a formalistic application leads
instead to four erroneous assumptions that result in the exclusion of
arguments by affected individuals in litigation.
First, some judges assume that the effects of the case extend only to
the parties before them. Thus they do not concern themselves with
views other than those presented by the lawyers for those parties. This
assumed limitation on the effect of the litigation may be true in some
few simplistic lawsuits, but increasingly it is a false assumption. With
the expansion of equitable remedies and the increasing use of the class
action, modem litigation frequently has direct legal effects well beyond
the actual formal parties.'
Second, the courts assume that if any people other than the parties
will be affected by the case, they will come forward on their own and
become parties to the litigation. Thus judges do not attempt to seek out
the views of absentees but wait passively for them to appear. This oc-
casionally may be correct. If, however, the affected absentees do not
4. See text accompanying notes 19-23 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 24-25, 75-76 & 94 infra.
6. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
ABA CODE].
7. Id EC 5-1.
8. Id EC 7-1, 7-4; Freedman, Professional Responsibiliy of the Criminal Defense Layer:
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469 (1966).
9. See text accompanying notes 28-53 infra.
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know about the litigation and their right to be heard, or cannot obtain
counsel to express their views, their existence may never be known.'"
Third, to the extent judges do take absentees' views into account,
they usually assume they know implicitly what those views are. Thus
they perceive no need to ask the absentees about their interests. Occa-
sionally, the court may guess correctly. Usually, however, the judge
must base his guess on very little actual experience with the absentee
group."I
Finally, the courts usually assume that the parties each have a uni-
tary interest in the litigation. Thus they assume that they need not look
for divergent views within the party and that they can rely on the
party's lawyer to present its interest. This may be true when the party
is an individual. When the party is a complex legal entity such as a
class, government agency, or corporation, however, the assumption fre-
quently is incorrect, particularly in modem public litigation.'2 A com-
plex legal entity is composed of several individuals, each occupying
different roles in the entity. Quite likely there are numerous confficting
interests within that entity.'3 Furthermore, in modem public litigation,
the lawyers and sponsoring organizations frequently advocate their
own interests.
14
This Article proposes a functional analysis of the interests affected by
the lawsuit and suggests techniques for the individuals with those inter-
ests to become involved in the litigation and to advocate those interests
to the judge before the decision is made. In every case, the court
should consider whether and in what way individuals other than the
parties may be affected. In cases in which absentees may be affected or
in which the parties are complex legal entities composed of a number
of individuals, the court should organize the interests into outcome po-
sitions for advocacy rather than assume that each party contains a uni-
tary interest.' 5 The court should ensure that there is an advocate for
each outcome position'6 and that the individuals who support each po-
sition know who their advocate is and have a means for communicat-
10. See text accompanying notes 96-103 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 104-06 infra.
12. See text accompanying notes 61-94 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 58-60, 69-78, & 89-93 infra.
14. See text accompanying notes 80-88 infra.
15. See text accompanying notes 108-19 infra.
16. See text accompanying notes 115-19 infra.
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ing with that advocate.' 7 In other words, the lawyers should represent
positions rather than parties. In this way the litigation will involve all
the affected individuals, and all will have their interests represented.
The judge will have the information and arguments from all the points
of view and thus will be better able to make a well-informed decision.
Finally, the people who must carry out the remedial order will be more
cooperative, because they will think the decision was reached fairly.
In simple private litigation, the adversary process does this interest
organization and involvement automatically. In modem complex pub-
lic litigation, however, the adversary system does not work automati-
cally. The judge must guide its workings to implement its policies.
This Article first will explore in greater depth the nature and source of
the problem, so as to alert judges to the situations in which they must
modify the adversary system mn order to obtain adequate representation
of all affected interests. This Article then proposes a method of interest
analysis, involvement, and advocacy, with several examples of how the
method would work in the types of problems of interest representation
most common in modem litigation.
II. THE PROBLEM: FORMALISTIC APPLICATION OF THE ADVERSARY
PROCESS TO MODERN COMPLEX LITIGATION
The adversary process for dispute resolution is an ingenious one.
Self interest of the parties and the lawyers fuels the system,' 8 which is
organized according to the psychological principle of separating the in-
vestigative function from the judging function so as not to influence the
investigation with predictions about the outcome.' 9
If the individual charged with investigating and developing the facts,
law, and policy involved in a case forms a tentative hypothesis concern-
ing some element of the case, further investigation naturally will tend
to proceed along lines that will confirm or support that hypothesis. The
investigator will not seek information that tends to disprove the tenta-
tive hypothesis, and if he does uncover contrary information, he will
likely ignore, forget, or misconstrue it.20 The danger of combining the
17. See text accompanying notes 120-23 infra.
18. See J. CouND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 1-2 (3d ed. 1980).
19. See ABA CODE, supra note 6, EC 7-19; Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Fac#nd.
ing Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083, 1091-92 (1975).
20. See E. LoFTus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979). See also Thibaut & Walker, A Theory
of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 541, 549-50 (1978).
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roles of decision maker and investigator, therefore, is that the individ-
ual will make a decision based on inadequate information and then
selectively develop the information to support the premature deci-
sion.21 To avoid this danger, the adversary system isolates the decision
maker from the case until the advocates complete their investigation.
The system further assigns each advocate a tentative hypothesis-his
client's best position-so that his investigation may proceed in the di-
rection that supports that position. Since their tentative hypotheses are
diametrically opposed, the facts that one side develops will be those
psychologically suppressed by the other side, and vice versa.
Self interest, on the part of both the client and the lawyer, motivates
them to investigate thoroughly and to advocate their position vigor-
ously. Both client and lawyer want to win the case, and both know that
only they will present the evidence and arguments for their side. The
judge will not do so, for he must remain impartial and passive.22 Simi-
larly, their opponent will not, because his interest in winning requires
that he present only the evidence and arguments that support his own
position. With both sides thoroughly investigating and vigorously ad-
vocating, however, the judge ultimately hears all the facts and all the
arguments. His resulting decision, therefore, is fully informed and
more probably correct.23
In addition to presenting all the information to the judge, the adver-
sary system is designed to involve the people who will be affected by
the decision. The courts are effective only because people voluntarily
comply with their orders. Although the courts can handle occasional
noncompliance (through the cooperation of others, such as the police),
they cannot function with large-scale resistance. People tend to comply
with judicial orders when they think they have been afforded the op-
portunity to participate in the process and make their points to the
judge.24 The adversary process, therefore, gives the parties control not
only of the investigation, but also of the presentation of evidence and
21. See, eg., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) ("tlhe Court's tentative
findings, made in the absence of established safeguards, may color the subsequent proceedings
and place an unfair burden on the defendant").
22. See ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canons 2, 3 (1979); ABA CODE, su.pra note 6,
EC 7-19.
23. See ABA CODE, supra note 6, EC 7-19, 7-20. See generally Damaska, supra note 19.
24. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1299
(1976). See general YeazelL, Intervention and the Idea of Litigation: A Commentary on the Los
Angeles School Case, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 244 (1977).
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arguments. As a result, whether the outcome is favorable or not, the
parties will believe it was reached fairly and should be obeyed.25 Such
is the ideology of the adversary system.
As applied to simple private litigation, the adversary system is
designed to effectuate automatically the two criteria for judicial legiti-
macy: a fully informed decision maker and the opportunity for all af-
fected individuals to participate. In the paradigm of private litigation,
the parties are the few individuals who will be concerned directly in the
remedy. They usually are divided into two camps, plaintiff and de-
fendant, and represent diametrically opposed views on the desired re-
sult of the litigation. 6  Because there are only two sides to the
controversy, and because each presents its version of the facts and ar-
guments of policy and law, the system ensures consideration of all the
relevant points of view and participation of all affected interests in the
decision making process.
An increasing amount of litigation does not resemble the simple two-
sided lawsuit paradigm, however. These new cases27 have been called
"public interest" litigation,28 "public law" litigation,29 "institutional re-
form" litigation,3" and "law reform test case" litigation,31 and they usu-
ally are characterized by two distinguishing features: complex parties
and complex remedies.
The relief sought in this type of litigation generally is injunctive, al-
though these cases may vary in scope and complexity, ranging from
simple actions for declaratory or injunctive relief seeking a rule
change32 to litigation seeking to reorder in detail a segment of society-
25. See Engstrom & Giles, Expectations and Images: .4 Note on Dffuse Supportfor Legal
Institutions, 6 L. & Soc'y REv. 631 (1972). See generally Walker, Lind & Thibaut, The Relation
Between Procedural and Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L. REV. 1401 (1979).
26. See Chayes, supra note 24, at 1282-83.
27. Although complex public litigation has generally been thought of as a new procedural
development, see Chayes, supra note 24, a persuasive case can be made that it is not particularly
novel in form, but only in the scope of the substantive rights it enforces. See Eisenberg & Yeazell,
The Ordinary and The Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARv. L. REv. 465 (1980).
28. See, ag., Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV.
L. REv. 849 (1975).
29. See, ag., Chayes, supra note 24.
30. See, ag., Comment, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM.
L. REv. 784 (1978); Note, Implementation Problems in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 91 HARV. L.
REv. 428 (1977).
31. See, eg., M. MELTSNER & P. SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY: MATERIALS FOR
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 77-124 (1974).
32. "Rule change" cases are those challenging a statute or regulation or other rule governing
[Vol. 60:37
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usually a governmental bureaucracy or corporation-according to
principles embodied in statutes and regulations or in the Constitution.
Typical examples of this form of lawsuit are prisoners' rights,33 em-
ployment discrimination, 34 welfare reform,35 and school desegrega-
tion 36 cases, but many other types of cases involve complex parties or
broad relief as well. The litigation ordinarily proceeds as a plaintiff
class action,37 with the single plaintiff representing the interests of a
large number of similarly situated individuals.38  The goal of the suit is
to have the court review the structure, policies, and practices of the
defendant and their impact on individuals, particularly members of the
plaintiff class, and then to have the court order restructuring of the de-
fendant according to a plan that satisfies the norms of the Constitution
and statutes. The resulting "structural" injunction39 begins with the
defendant's initial interpretation of what constitutes compliance with
the law and develops into an agreement that the plaintiff helps to
a defendant's conduct. See Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069, 1076-
77 (1970).
33. Eg., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
34. E.g., United States Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Department of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
35. Eg., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
36. Eg., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 and state counterparts. See Comment, supra note 30, at 875-76.
38. Although many public interest cases are class actions, many others are not. Shareholder
derivative suits, and suits for declaratory relief or simple injunctive relief against a government
agency, for example, may have broad "public interest" effect. See Homburger, Private Suits in the
Public Interest in the UnitedStates fAmerica, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 343 (1974). Many civil rights
cases could be brought without the class action rule. See Miller, OfFrankenstein Monsters and
Shining Knights.- Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REv. 664, 672 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Miller, Frankenstein Monsters]. Whenever the issue is one of interpretation of
a law that concededly applies to a group, an individual action will have a classwide effect. See
Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Clasr Action, Part P The Industrialization of Group Litigation,
27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 514, 518-19 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Yeazell, Part I]. In a Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(2) class action, because the injury is classwide, the relief is appropriately classwide, even if
the suit had been brought individually. See Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action, Part
. Interest, Class and Representation, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1067, 1110, 1118 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Yeazell, Part 11]. See also Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963). This is particularly
common in employment discrimination cases. See Miller, An Overview ofFederal Class Actions:
Past, Present and Future, 4 JusT. Sys. J. 197, 209 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Miller, Overview];
Comment, To What Extent Can a Court Remedy Classwide Discrimination in an Individual Suit
Under Title VII, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 388 (1976). Although the class action is a common charac-
teristic of modem complex litigation, it is not a necessary or definitional one. The definitional
characteristics of this type of litigation are complex parties and broad remedial impact.
39. See 0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONs 415-17 (1972).
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These broad remedy cases have become frequent. 41 At one time
judges were reluctant to issue injunctions that would require continu-
ing judicial supervision. Today they take control of prison systems,
school systems, and other large societal organizations, if not eagerly, at
least without significant hesitation.42 At one time, judges deferred to
the expertise of prison wardens, psychiatrists, and other managers of
society. Today they are increasingly willing to hold these experts' ac-
tions to a vague due process of law standard.43 Whether the credit or
blame goes to activist judges,44 free legal aid,45 the explosion of rights
and of proceedings to enforce them, 6 or to the liberalization in 1966 of
the federal class action rule,47 the clear fact is that social reform litiga-
tion seeking broad injunctive relief is now common, 48 and it probably
40. This remedy is frequently a product of negotiation between the parties. Even if it is
judicially created, the plaintiffs' suggestions are usually considered. Chayes, supra note 24, at
1298-1301; Comment, supra note 30, at 809-12. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,
576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978); Interview with M. Davidson in M. MELTSNER & P. SCHRAO, supra
note 31, at 261. But see Martin Luther King Jr. Elementary School Children v. Ann Arbor School
Dist. Bd., 473 F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Mich. 1979), and the discussion of the remedy building process
in that case at text accompanying notes 140-41 infra.
41. See Cahn & Calm, Power to the People or the Profession? The Public Interest in Public
Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005, 1008-11 (1970); Kirkham, Complex CivilLitigatton-Have Good
Intentions Gone Awry, 70 F.R.D. 199, 204-05 (1976); Miller, Frankenstein Monsters, supra note
38, at 668, 670-72, 674-76.
42. See Chayes, supra note 24, at 1292-96; Developments in the La -Injunctions, 78 HARV.
L. REv. 994, 1012-13, 1061-63 (1965).
43. Compare Sutton v. Settle, 302 F.2d 286, 288 (8th Cir. 1962) ("[c]ourts have uniformly
held that supervision of inmates of federal institutions rests with the proper administrative author-
ities and that courts have no power to supervise the management and disciplinary rules of such
institutions") with Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 381 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[i]n considering the Dis-
trict Court's order and the remedies required for violations of inmates' rights, we note. .. 'Once a
right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy
past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies' ").
44. See Satter, Changing Role of Courts and Legislatures, II CONN. L. REV. 230 (1979).
45. See COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 6-10
(1976); Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public
Interest Practice, 58 B.U.L. REv. 337 (1978).
46. See Calm & Cahn, supra note 41.
47. See Blecher, Is the Class Action Rule Doing the Job? (Plainiff's Viewpoint), 55 F.R.D. 365
(1972); Simon, ClassActions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375 (1972). But see
Miller, Frankenstein Monsters, supra note 38.
48. Professor Yeazell has thoroughly and persuasively documented the proposition that the
phenomenon of social reform litigation has existed as long as litigation has and is nothing new.
See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 27; Yeazell, Part 1, supra note 38; Yeazell, Part II, supra
note 38; Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History ofthe Class Action, 77
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss1/3
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will not become less common in the future.
The scope of the remedy in public interest litigation, as compared to
private litigation, has two effects that result in the breakdown of the
adversary process in public interest cases. First, persons not even tech-
nically involved in the lawsuit as parties are bound by its results.4 9 Of
course, people who are not parties to a traditional private lawsuit nev-
ertheless are subject to its stare decisis effect, but this effect is limited.50
In subsequent litigation, absentees are free to argue either that there are
significant distinctions between their case and the earlier one that
should change the outcome, or that the earlier result was unwise and
should be modified or overruled. The court is free to reach a different
result in the subsequent case without disturbing the finality of the ear-
lier one.5 Thus the interests directly involved in the private lawsuit are
exclusively those of the litigants. The public interest lawsuit, on the
other hand, may result in a reordering of relations among a large
number of individuals and entities. Absentees may be legally bound to
the outcome,52 but in any event they pragmatically are foreclosed from
relitigating the principle as it affects them. The court cannot reach a
different result in a subsequent case without disturbing the finality of
the earlier one.53 Thus the interests involved in this form of litigation
are often broader than the parties to it. An example of this effect on
COLUM. L. REv. 866 (1977). Its frequency of use and the extent of its effect on society in recent
years, however, is extraordinary.
49. See Comment, supra note 30, at 906-07.
50. Cf. Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967) (stare decisis effect
on an absentee gave rise to a right of intervention because the usual limitations on stare decisis,
the freedom to argue factual distinctions or incorrectness of the earlier decision, were pragmati-
cally inapplicable). In many public interest suits, because the crucial issue is one of law, stare
decisis may bind absentees just as tightly as resjudicata would. See Yeazell, Part1, supra note 38,
at 518-19.
51. The earlier case need not be reopened and modified to be consistent with the later change
in law, because repose or finality of the judgment is an important value of the legal process. For
this reason, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) does not contemplate relief from a judgment on the grounds that
the law has changed. Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys., 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972).
52. Members of a class adequately represented, holders of joint interests, and individuals
who have some close relationship with a party may be bound through res judicata even though not
parties to the lawsuit themselves. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
53. This is true because both orders would operate inconsistently on the same bureaucracy.
See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., No. 74-P-339-S (N.D. Ala. April 12,
1974) (consent decree):
This Decree resolves all issues relating to acts and practices of discrimination by the
defendants to which this Decree is directed, as well as any future effects of such acts and
practices. . . . If a private individual seeks, in a separate action or proceeding, relief
other than back pay which would add to or be inconsistent with. . . this Decree, the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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absentees is the impact of a school desegregation case on white students
and parents. Although they usually are not even technically part of the
party structure, their lives nevertheless are affected, and they are
pragmatically bound.
Second, the complex remedy-building process in public interest cases
results in divisions of interests that do not always coincide with the
theoretical plaintiff-defendant division or even with the party struc-
ture.5 4 Although private lawsuits operate according to an established
system of mechanically inferring the single appropriate remedy solely
from the nature of the claim," the creation of a remedy in public inter-
est litigation involves inventing a complex scheme of societal interac-
tions to replace the existing unconstitutional or illegal scheme. 6
Courts must choose a remedy from the almost infinite variety of
schemes that could be designed to square with the constitutional or
statutory norm. Frequently each of the several different options will
have supporters among the affected individuals.5 Unlike the liability
stage, in which the bipolar choice is whether or not to find liability, the
remedy stage of public interest litigation may have a many faceted in-
terest array. Moreover, because the remedy-building process can be
lengthy, with early choices foreclosing some future options and open-
ing up others, the interest array can be expected to shift with each new
choice.
Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Association Local 550 v. American
plaintiffs will undertake to advise the Court... that such relief in that action or pro-
ceeding is unwarranted.
Discussing this provision, the district court noted "that resolution in the forum of issues between
the government and the defendants does not preclude additional-or even inconsistent-relief in
favor of private parties in other litigation." United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 63
F.R.D. 1, 6 (N.D. Ala. 1974). The court of appeals agreed, stating, "[t]he government concedes, of
course, and no one seriously argues contrariwise, that no forum court will be legally obliged to
follow any government recommendation of dismissal, stay or transfer as to any separate suit filed
in such court." United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 837 (5th Cir. 1975).
But see Martini v. Republic Steel Corp., 532 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1976), upholding dismissal of a
subsequent related action, seeking separate relief from a defendant covered by this consent decree,
on principles of comity. See also Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 468 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir.
1972), reversing dismissal of a private employment discrimination lawsuit seeking relief arguably
inconsistent with the continuing injunction earlier obtained by the government in United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 312 F. Supp. 977 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), modofed, 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
54. See Comment, supra note 30, at 902-06.
55. Chayes, supra note 24, at 1282-83.
56. Id at 1296.
57. See Yeazell, Part II, supra note 38, at 1112-13.
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Airlines58 provides an example of this shifting interest array. The
union of airline stewardesses and several individuals brought a class
action suit, challenging the airlines' policy of firing pregnant steward-
esses. The class consisted of both present and former stewardesses who
were united in interest against the policy. Beyond the issue of liability,
however, the interests separated over questions such as back pay and
accrual of seniority. The former stewardesses wanted seniority from
the time of the illegal discharge until reinstatement. This goal was ad-
verse to the interests of the junior currently employed stewardesses,
however, because seniority determines trip assignments.5 9
On the back pay question, the interests again were aligned differ-
ently. Current stewardesses had little interest in the question one way
or the other. Within the group of former stewardesses, however, many
were unlikely to recover any back pay if their individual cases were
litigated, although some might have recovered substantial amounts.
Because the airlines were unwilling to compromise on the issue, litiga-
tion estimated to last five years would be necessary to recover the back
pay for the few. The union counsel compromised the back pay interest
to obtain a settlement containing a reinstatement provision so that for-
mer stewardesses could return to work immediately rather than in five
years.60
These remedies not only affect those absent from the lawsuit, but
also act upon a complex interest structure that does not coincide with
the party structure. The potential for the broad impact of the remedy
often generates an attempt to include, at least technically, everyone to
be affected by naming complex legal entities as parties. Thus a class,
perhaps with subclasses, may sue a governmental bureaucracy, such as
a school board. If the class is defined broadly enough, it can encom-
pass all those persons potentially affected on one side. On the other
side, the school board includes the administration, teachers, perhaps
the students and parents, and perhaps even the general public, because
school board members are elected representatives. Similarly, a union,
perhaps coupled with a class, may sue a corporation. The union repre-
58. Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d
636 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
59. Because the lawyer represented the union, and only currently employed stewardesses
were union members, it is not surprising that the negotiated settlement provided for minimal
accrued seniority for the former stewardesses.
60. Again, this could be predicted, because the many returning to work will be members of
the union, while the few collecting back pay may not be.
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sents the employees, while the corporation stands for the corporate
board, the officers, the shareholders, and even those employees not rep-
resented by the union. This formal involvement of absentee interests,
however, is a legal fiction that satisfies due process requirements only
in the most technical sense. It does not meaningfully involve the af-
fected interests in a way that fully informs the judge or that causes the
people who must obey the decree to believe it was reached fairly.
When a single counsel represents a complex party, the self-interest that
drives the adversary system now works to mask the true diversity of
interests within the party and the litigation.
The failure of the adversary process in public interest litigation is
attributable primarily to the fiction that a legal party is monolithic in
interest. An individual human being has a single preferred outcome
position on an issue, but a group of people probably has both a major-
ity and minority view. Although the individual may have mixed feel-
ings about the issue, it is appropriate for him to suppress his less
strongly felt view and advocate only the dominant one. Such behavior
is illegitimate, however, when the legal party is a group of individu-
als.61 Yet the adversary process expects, and perhaps even requires,
counsel to suppress the minority view.
In the traditional simplistic private lawsuit, the task of representing
61. In some types of litigation involving complex parties, the existence of minority dissenting
interests within the party is doubtful, and their suppression may be appropriate. Thus, when one
corporation sues another for money damages for breach of contract, we could predict that the
individuals who compose each corporation would prefer their corporation to win. Their interest is
purely financial self-interest, and we can reasonably assume that people prefer more rather than
less money. See Yeazell, ParIl, supra note 38, at 1083-84, 1111. Even if dissenting interests were
present in this hypothetical private contract action with complex parties, their suppression is of
less concern for three reasons. First, there is probably no particularly public policy involved,
unlike the typical public interest lawsuit, so that the effects of the litigation are more limited
(though the extent to which this is true depends in some measure on whether the suit will resolve
issues of fact, which are more limited and private, or issues of law, which may bind thousands of
corporations and millions of people through stare decisis and may effectively reorder commercial
society). Second, by becoming directors, officers, shareholders, and even employees of the corpo-
ration, the individuals voluntarily submitted themselves to an internal dispute resolution mecha-
nism, including, for example, the corporate bylaws and the union contract, and may have no
legitimate claim to a right to register dissent outside that mechanism. See note 79 infra. Finally,
the remedy in the hypothetical case, payment of money, does not depend for effectiveness on the
voluntary compliance of the large group of individuals who compose the entity, but only on one or
two readily identifiable individuals whose cooperation can be coerced through contempt if neces-
sary. Thus voluntary compliance, which comes from satisfaction with the process as a result of
participation and adequate representation, is unnecessary. For these reasons this Article focuses
on the typical public interest case, though the analysis is applicable to some private cases as well.
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the client's interest is, in theory, not a difficult one. The attorney is
required to describe fully and fairly the client's options, including all
their implications and ramifications. After he is fully informed, the cli-
ent makes the choice of goals, and the attorney is bound to respect that
choice and urge its adoption by the court.62 Although this paradig-
matic vision may overestimate ability to present or hear a "full and
fair" description of options, 63 it is nevertheless the stated ideology of
the legal profession.
In a public interest lawsuit, however, the model of the attorney as
conduit for the client's interests is inappropriate. 64 The attorney cannot
meet with a class that is too numerous for joinder in a lawsuit, explain
fully all the options in an intricate suit seeking an injunction to reorder
a bureaucracy, and obtain a unanimous decision. The attorney cannot
consult the governmental or corporate entity, but must speak to the
individuals with the greatest authority, who have only certain interests
at heart. He also may consult a representative sample of the individu-
als who compose the party. In the end, however, it is the lawyer's de-
termination of the party's self-interest and the goal it would choose that
controls.65 Moreover, because the choice of goals in public interest liti-
gation is inchoate and complex, the attorney may have difficulty fully
and fairly explaining the choices without characterizing and subjec-
tively weighting them to conform to his own values and views of the
client's best interest. Because a variety of differing interests necessarily
exist within a complex party, the lawyer has the job of sorting through
the interests, weighing them, reconciling them when possible, and sup-
pressing the less powerful interests when necessary.
The suppression of minority dissenting views is pragmatically una-
voidable and may be ethically mandated. To inform the court of a
minority disagreement with the majority position on an issue would
severely undermine the force of an attorney's advocacy for his chosen
position. In light of the attorney's natural desire to prevail, he can only
be expected to suppress dissenting viewpoints within the complex
party. Indeed, the ethical requirement of representing the client zeal-
62. ABA CODE, supra note 6, EC 7-7, 7-8. See also Developments in the Law--Class Actions,
89 HARv. L. REv. 1318, 1592 (1976).
63. See Lehman, The Pursuit ofa Client's Interest, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 1078 (1979).
64. See generall, Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 62, at 1592-97.
65. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1175-80 (5th Cir. 1978);
Comment, supra note 30, at 784-86. See also Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 512 (1976).
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ously might be violated by such equivocal advocacy. 66
The image asserted by counsel of a party united in interest contrasts
sharply with the reality of an entity held together merely by a legal
fiction and possessing as many points of view as there are potential
outcomes on any particular issue. The presence of differing viewpoints
among class members is well established and is recognized by the re-
quirement that judicial scrutiny test both the adequacy of representa-
tion and the typicality of claims or defenses among the various class
members.67 Upon examination, it is apparent that other complex par-
ties are also diverse in interest structure, in contrast to their fictional
unity.68
Frequently, government agencies are parties to public interest law-
suits. The individuals named as parties, however, are normally only
the top rank of officials, and the individuals who have direct service
contact with the public are not formally involved in the litigation.
Thus, for example, a civil rights action challenging the constitutionality
of an aspect of a state prison may name the governor, the director of
the state's prison system, and the superintendent or warden of the par-
ticular prison as defendants. The direct actors in the system, such as
guards and social workers, are not formally included in the party struc-
ture. A single lawyer from the state attorney general's office ordinarily
represents the variety of official defendants in the litigation. The attor-
ney general's office, however, frequently acts as an independent evalu-
ator and protector of the public interest rather than as a conduit for the
interests of its particular governmental clients.69 Conflicts of interest
66. See ABA CODE, supra note 6, Canon 7. But see Developments in the Law-ClassActlons,
supra note 62, at 1595-96, suggesting that the lawyer has a duty to report conflicts of interest
among class members to the judge. Such a rule is both unrealistic and counterproductive. The
self-interest that fuels the adversary process, see text accompanying notes 22-23 supra, makes it
unlikely that the lawyer would report dissenting views, and the fact that the lawyer is psychologi-
cally programmed to ignore information contrary to his assumptions, see text accompanying notes
20-21 supra, makes it unlikely he will notice antagonistic views. Even if the rule were workable,
however, it would discourage lawyers from soliciting views from other than their named represen-
tative client, lest antagonism to their chosen position surface. Moreover, disclosure of this infor-
mation is arguably itself unethical, revealing a "secret" of the client. ABA CODE, supra note 6,
Canon 4.
67. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3), (4).
68. See Comment, supra note 30, at 902-06.
69. See, eg., Secretary of Admin. and Fin. v. Attorney Gen., 367 Mass. 154, 326 N.E.2d 334
(1975). The Massachusetts Attorney General may refuse to prosecute an appeal for the head of a
state agency he represents in litigation, despite the client's desire to appeal, when, in the Attorney
General's judgment, the appeal would not be in the public interest. Id
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among these named defendants, that is, differences about what result
should be advocated on various issues in the litigation, may be ex-
pected. By contrast, the defense counsel usually presents to the judge
an apparently unified position of defendants on any particular issue.
This unified position is generated by the same process as is performed
by a lawyer representing a party in a class action: selection, characteri-
zation, and suppression of interests within the complex client entity.
Unfortunately, the points of view most likely to be suppressed in this
process may be those most germane to the issue-those of the prison
administration, the guards, and the social workers, who, although inti-
mately involved in the process under consideration by the court, are
uninvolved in the process by which it is considered.
Another common type of party in public interest cases is the govern-
mental policy making board, which has a bureaucracy implementing
and executing its policies. Typically, the board will not be unified on
an issue, but will contain both a majority and a minority, each with
different interests, and both differing from the third interest of the bu-
reaucratic entity. In school desegregation cases, for example, the de-
fendant may be the school committee, composed of a majority resisting
systemwide restructuring and the minority welcoming it, and the school
department that oversees such concerns as safety, efficiency, and educa-
tional quality. The single lawyer for this composite defendant, unable
to represent all three interests7° simultaneously, will probably advocate
either the position of the committee majority, which is the legally con-
trolling interest group in this complex party, or the position of the
school superintendent if he is the official with the most frequent contact
with the lawyer.7' Again, the views and desires of those most directly
involved with the plaintiffs and affected by the litigation-the teach-
ers,72 school administrators, parents, and children not members of the
70. The scope of interests contained in the school board defendant may be even broader than
its institutional structure. Because it is intended to be representative of the population it serves,
the board may be considered to include the interests of the parents and the citizenry in general.
See, e.g., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
71. See Wilton, Legitimacy in Social Reform Liigallox" An Empirical Study, 15 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 189 (1982).
72. Teachers' unions on occasion intervene in a school desegregation case to represent the
interest of the teachers. As with any other complex party, however, the union cannot truly recon-
cile all of the interests of its varied members, black and white, kindergarten and high school,
English and physical education. The union leaders, who may not be active teachers, will hire,
pay, and instruct the lawyers. Teachers union intervention may broaden the representation of
interests in the lawsuit, but is unlikely to complete it.
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plaintiff class-are not represented in the decisionmaking process.
This suppression of interests creates two unfortunate effects on the
judicial process in complex public litigation: it screens useful informa-
tion from the judge, and it discourages necessary voluntary compliance
with the remedial plan. It is apparent that those persons most affected
but least involved in the adjudicatory process, the line workers, have a
great deal of valuable information that the court should know about
when making remedial choices. The contact point between plaintiffs
and the defendant bureaucracy should be the focus of a public interest
lawsuit. The workers who form that contact point should be helpful
participants in the creation of a remedial plan. The present method of
interest analysis in public interest litigation, however, dominated as it is
by outmoded party theory, tends to suppress this helpful information
rather than expose it. It is clearly in the interest of a more competent
and just adjudicatory system to encourage the participation of these
currently excluded interests in public interest litigation.
Moreover, these unrepresented persons in the lower levels of the bu-
reaucracy are the ones who must carry the remedial plan into opera-
tion.73 Their exclusion from the litigation process can result in their
resistance to the judicial order. In very practical terms, if the people
who are affected by the decree have had an opportunity to present their
point of view to the judge for consideration, they are more likely to
respect and obey the ultimate order of the court, even if it is adverse to
them. If they are disenfranchised, ignored, and uninvolved in the pro-
cess, they are more likely to respond by ignoring the orders of the court,
which they will perceive as unfairly generated and hence illegitimate.74
Because the typical public interest case yields a complex injunctive
remedy, noncompliance is often difficult to determine and eliminate. It
is unlikely the court would even hear of a teacher's behavior in class
toward black students, for example, let alone invoke contempt powers
to correct it.75 The court must rely on voluntary compliance in these
73. See Note, su.pra note 30, at 440.
74. See Wilton, supra note 71.
75. Judges are extremely reluctant to use contempt power in these types of cases. See, e.g.,
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 1299 (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated, 431
F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (district court order reinstated) a school discrimi-
nation case. Despite orders on April 23, 1969, 300 F. Supp. 1358; June 20, 1969, 300 F. Supp.
1381; and August 15, 1969, 306 F. Supp. 1291, the defendant school board failed to submit and
implement a satisfactory school desegregation plan. When, on November 17, 1969, the board
failed to comply with still another deadline, the plaintiffs moved for contempt citations against
[Vol. 60:37
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cases, which is unlikely to occur unless the affected interests are
brought into the remedy-building process.76 Handling a public interest
case in the same manner as a private lawsuit, however, minimizes the
involvement of these affected interests.
Similarly, treatment of the business corporation defendant as a uni-
tary interest ignores the reality of its complex interest structure. Differ-
ent corporate officers may prefer different results in litigation in which
the corporation is a party. The board of directors, like the school
board, probably contains a majority and minority view, and the prefer-
ences of the individual stockholders can be expected to vary. Addition-
ally, although they are not part of the corporate ownership and
governance structure, the employees of a business pragmatically must
be considered a component part of the defendant entity,7 7 with an im-
portant and often differing78 interest in litigation that seeks to re-
arrange the corporate bureaucracy. The analysis of pragmatic interests
of a complex corporate defendant frequently merges into the analysis
of interests of the complex plaintiff, because stockholders or employees
are those who most often bring public interest litigation against busi-
ness corporations. The examination of outcome-oriented interests in
public interest litigation, therefore, must be direct and pragmatic rather
than a blind reference to the party structure.
There normally are some formal hierarchical rules within the corpo-
rate structure that resolve this conflict, rules that the system may be
justified in honoring. 79 State laws governing corporations or the corpo-
members of the school board. Though it admitted that the "evidence might very well support
such citations," 306 F. Supp. at 1314, the court deferred action, stating that contempt citations
would be avoided if possible. See also Interview with M. Davidson in M. MELTSNER & P.
SCHRAG, supra note 31, at 258; Note, supra note 30, at 448-49.
76. See Chayes, supra note 24, at 1299; Yeazell, supra note 24, at 258-60; Note, supra note 30,
at 439.
77. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d) provides that an injunction issued against a party shall bind its
employees.
78. See, e.g., In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548 (1897). One railroad, employing nonunion workers,
obtained an injunction against another railroad, whose unionized workers had refused to handle
the nonunion railroad's cars. It is unlikely that the defendant railroad hotly contested the suit or
presented the union's or employees' positions to the court. The employees were bound by the
injunction, however, and engineer Lennon was held in contempt for his failure to comply.
79. The sole fact that an entity is the legal subject of the litigation should not foreclose indi-
vidual members of the entity from expressing dissenting views, for an entity is functionally no
more than the sum of its membership. An entity may, however, demand obedience to majority
rule and suppression of dissent as a price for membership; such a demand may be met voluntarily
in return for inclusion in the entity. Corporate officers and directors may fit this description. On
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rate bylaws usually include provisions allocating authority to control
certain decisions and ensuring some protection for minority interests.
Employment contracts and laws governing employee relations may
provide some protection for employee interests. These protections are
pragmatically too cumbersome and inflexible, however, to be useful in
the litigation context, particularly for representing employee and share-
holder interests. Those most intimately affected by the litigation are
again those least involved by the formal party-interest analysis.
The model of attorney as conduit for the client's interest fails in pub-
lic interest litigation not only because of the inherent inability of one
advocate to present the varied interests within a complex party, but also
frequently because of a conflict of interest between the client's desires
and the attorney's own view of the public interest. Issue-oriented or-
ganizations commonly are involved with, or even control, the interests
asserted in court by plaintiffs in public interest litigation.80 Often the
organizations are themselves plaintiffs suing either to assert their own
organizational interests directly or those of their members deriva-
tively.8' Most commonly, the organization supplies counsel, either a
member of its own staff or a lawyer affiliated with the organization, or
it funds litigation expenses, which often include counsel fees. 2
Whatever form the organizational involvement takes, it generally con-
trols the litigation. Lawyers employed by issue-oriented organizations
tend naturally to agree with and support the organization's policies.
Counsel who merely are affiliated with the organization and those
the other hand, membership in a racial group is not the sort of choice from which a voluntary
waiver of individual views for the benefit of the group may be inferred. Membership in a govern-
mental unit, although more or less voluntary, has not been thought generally to carry the require-
ment of forgoing expressions of dissent.
No individual is ever required to express a view in litigation that differs from that of the entity.
The court may give some deference to the entity's position as against differing views of its constit-
uents by respecting to a degree its presumptively valid internal system for resolving differences,
Unless the constituents voluntarily waive their right to express dissent, however, the court should
not adhere to an entity's fictional unity of interest.
80. See Miller, Frankenstein Mlonster, supra note 38, at 685-86; Miller, Overview, supra note
38, at 213; Yeazell, Partl, supra note 38, at 1115; Comment, supra note 30, at 874-75, 883-87. See
generaly Bell, supra note 65; Halpern & Cunningham, Rflections on the New Public interest Law.-
Theory and Practice at the Centerfor Law and Social Policy, 59 GEo. L.. 1095 (1971); Hegland,
Beyond Enthusiasm and Commitment, 13 ARmZ. L. REv. 805 (1971). See also Gulf Oil Co. v.
Bernard, 101 S. Ct. 2193, 2199 n.ll (1981).
81. See, ag., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
82. This is the normal practice, for example, of the NAACP'and the American Civil Liberties
Union.
[Vol. 60:37
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss1/3
COMPLEX LITIGATION INTERESTS
whose fees in the particular litigation are being paid by the organiza-
tion may have less commitment to its policies, but they nevertheless are
subject to pressure to advance the organization's goals rather than
those of the client. Affiliation reflects at least general agreement with
the organization's goals, and, though it is improper, lawyers naturally
will tend to serve the source of their income in a particular case at the
expense of their client.83 Finally, because most organizations that fund
complex, protracted, and hence expensive litigation have well-known
policies they seek to advance through litigation,84 the lawyer and client
seeking such funding will often modify their litigation goals to fit into
the organization's guidelines.
Although the conflict or disparity between the individual interest and
organizational policy is more often potential than actual, courts must
be sensitive to the problem in order to recognize true conflict. Rather
than reflecting in accurate proportion the views of all individuals whose
factual situations are similar, these litigation-sponsoring organizations
frequently espouse a particular solution or predisposition to the group
problem.8 5 Although the organization proclaims itself representative of
a particular group of people, such as blacks or women, in reality it
reflects the policy goals of only a segment of that group, such as those
blacks who prefer busing to neighborhood schools and those women
who seek the elimination rather than the protection of female labor
laws. In school desegregation litigation, for example, 6 a small number
of individuals serve as named representatives and purportedly repre-
sent all black (and/or other minority) school children and their parents.
The lawyers, however, usually are supplied and effectively controlled
by the NAACP, an organization with a strong policy commitment to
the particular remedy of busing. The named plaintiff is not free to alter
or modify the policy, and that remedy will be advocated to the court as
the desire and interest of the plaintiff class. This will be true despite
disagreements among members of the class as to the desirability of this
remedy. Blacks who disagree, of course, should be entitled to intervene
at the point when their outcome-oriented interest is no longer ade-
83. See Berlin, Roisman & Kessler, Public Interest Law, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 675, 681-82
(1970); ABA CODE, supra note 6, EC 5-22, DR 5-107.
84. See Bell, supra note 65.
85. See Berlin, Roisman & Kessler, supra note 83, at 684-85; Comment, supra note 30, at 884-
85. See generally Bell, supra note 65.
86. This scenario is drawn from Bell, supra note 65.
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quately represented by the advocates in the litigation.8 7 This path,
however, is often not available. If no dissent presents itself to the court,
the court may assume that the organization's policy reflects the unified
position of the plaintiff class.
This organizational control of interest advocacy in public interest
litigation seems to be directly contrary to the norms of professional eth-
ics, which proscribe conflicts between the client's interest and the inter-
est of the attorney's organizational employer.88 Because the definition
of the class interest by the lawyers is inherently a discretionary task,
however, and because the lawyers honestly may believe that the con-
sensus of the class agrees with the organizational policy, the actions of
the organization's lawyers realistically comport with the ethical stan-
dards. The lawyers are not misrepresenting the client's interest, but,
rather, they are simplifying it. The result is that in describing their
client's desires to the court, they are telling the truth, but not the whole
truth.
The suspicions of conflicts of interest within a complex party, the
pattern of selecting those views to advocate and those to suppress, and
the resulting resistance to the remedy by the disenfranchised lower
levels of the bureaucracy are all confirmed by an empirical study of
Ann Arbor's "Black English" case.89 In that case, a group of parents of
low income black children sued the school system because they were
dissatisfied with the response of the upper middle class white school to
their educationally disadvantaged children.
Although the case contained complex parties and conflicts of interest
on both sides, an analysis of the defendant will suffice to illustrate the
nature of the problem. The Ann Arbor School Board was the named
defendant. During the course of the litigation, new board members
were elected who changed the majority of the nine person board on
several issues in the case. The schools were run on a daily basis by a
large, politically powerful central administration, and the superinten-
dent of schools and several of his top aides were actively involved in
the case. The focus of the case was the King School, which employed a
87. FED. R. Cirv. P. 24(a). Apparently this theoretical right to intervene frequently is denied.
See Bell, supra note 65, at 506.
88. See ABA CODE, supra note 6, EC 5-23, 5-24.
89. Martin Luther King Jr. Elementary School Children v. Ann Arbor School Dist. Bd., 473
F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Mich. 1979). For a complete report of this study, the results, conclusions, and
suggestions for change in the judicial process, see Wilton, supra note 71.
[Vol. 60:37
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss1/3
COMPLEX LITIGATION INTERESTS
principal and 34 teachers and professional staff. One lawyer repre-
sented this complex party.
When faced with decisions in this case, the lawyer followed a pattern
common in representation of complex parties.9° First, he assessed the
alternatives and decided for himself the choice that would best serve
the client's interest. Next, he discussed the choice with the individual
who was monitoring the litigation for the complex client, in this case
the superintendent. In presenting the choice, though, the lawyer proba-
bly painted his own preference in a more favorable light than the alter-
natives. The superintendent made the final decision on many issues,
but occasionally the full board was consulted. In those instances, the
board was presented with a choice and with the recommendation of its
lawyer and superintendent. The lawyer and superintendent also sup-
plied nearly all the information helpful in evaluating that recommen-
dation. As a result, although the vote of the school board majority
ultimately controlled the litigation, the lawyer and superintendent
often pragmatically controlled the vote.91 The individual teachers,
with little influence on the school board or central administration and
less influence on the lawyer, had almost no voice in the litigation.
The lawyer presented a single view of the defendant entity in court.
The results of a survey of the individuals who made up this entity,92
however, show a division of interest on almost every issue, a division
that crossed party lines and even crossed groupings within the party.
For example, when the individuals who were part of the defendant
group were asked whether they wanted the court to find for plaintiffs or
for defendant, one third of the respondents favored plaintiffs. Every
component group in the defendant entity--school board, central ad-
ministration, and teachers-demonstrated this support for plaintiffs.
90. The description of how the school board's counsel made advocacy decisions is based on
an interview with the attorney.
91. The lawyer's pragmatic control of the decision by this pattern of communication is illus-
trated by the one exception to the pattern. When deciding whether to appeal the finding of liabil-
ity, the board initially considered the question in executive session, and by a 5-4 vote decided,
based on the recommendation of the superintendent and their counsel, in favor of appealing.
Then the board decided it had to vote on the question at a public meeting, at which other inter-
ested people, including plaintiffs' counsel, could address the board. After hearing other informa-
uon and perspectives on the question, a single vote changed sides, and the board voted not to
appeal.
92. The survey questions were mailed to 56 members of the school board, the school system
administration, and the staff and teachers of the King School. Six questionnaires were unable to
be delivered by the post office, and 25 were completed and returned, for a 50% response rate.
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The survey revealed similar divisions of interest within the defendant
entity on such questions as whether to appeal, whether to defend or
settle, and how to structure the remedial plan. The dissent was wide-
spread and often amounted to a majority of the individual members of
the entity actually opposing the entity's position.93 Nonetheless, the
lawyer presented an image of the defendant as unified and never made
the judge aware of the dissent.
Squelching the dissent in the litigation process probably created
problems in implementing the remedy. The individuals in the defend-
ant entity, particularly the teachers, registered strong dissatisfaction
with the result in the case, dissatisfaction that they said would have
been lessened or eliminated if their views had been represented.94 The
judicial system, however, ordered these strongly dissatisfied teachers to
change their attitude toward the plaintiffs, to be more accepting and
positive toward them in class. It would not be surprising if some of the
feelings of hostility and resentment created by the judicial process
made it difficult for the teachers to carry out this remedial order.
The systemic response to the failure of the adversary process to in-
volve dissenting interests is either that the interests should involve
themselves through intervention or that the judge should take on the
job of representing all absentees. Neither of these methods, however, is
likely to be effective.
Intervention 95 does not adequately ensure participation by those in-
dividuals in a complex party whose interests have been suppressed, be-
93. Of the eight features of the plan, the total defendant group preferred defendant's version
on three, plaintiffs' version on two, and split on three. The teacher subgroup preferred defendant's
version on three, plaintiffs' version on three, and split on two.
94. Respondents indicated the degree of their agreement or disagreement with various state-
ments about the case. The relevant results are indicated in the tables below.
strongly strongly
agree agree disagree disagree
I was satisfied with the result in the case.
TOTAL DEFENDANT GROUP 0 7 3 14
TEACHERS ONLY 0 1 1 10
I would have been more satisfied if my views were
presented, even if the result were the same.
TOTAL DEFENDANT GROUP 4 11 2 0
TEACHERS ONLY 2 7 1 0
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 24. It can be argued that intervention may technically be unavailable in
certain circumstances even to individuals whose lives will be affected by a remedy and whose
preferences differ from those advocated by the lawyers in court. See Yeazell, supra note 24. But,
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cause the potential dissenters cannot always be expected to present
themselves to the court.9 6 Often they are not aware of the pendency of
the lawsuit let alone the remedial choices and issues under active con-
sideration. 97 Notice in public interest class actions is frequently ineffec-
tive because it is not required to be individual9" or continuing in
nature. 99 Even those who receive notice of the initiation of an action
and who agree on liability issues may be unaware that the case, months
or years later, has proceeded to the remedy phase. They may be una-
ware that their representative advocates a remedial position that may
differ from their individual preference and interest."° Alternatively,
dissenters aware of the difference between their position and that of the
class representative may be unable to procure counsel to assist their
intervention. Since much public interest litigation is brought on behalf
of disadvantaged minorities' 0' who cannot personally afford counsel,
dissenters are forced to rely upon public service organizations to supply
counsel for them. Typically, however, these organizations, because
they are few in number and limited in their issue orientation, are al-
ready involved in the litigation and are unable to represent the conffict-
ing position of dissenters.102 Finally, class dissenters may be
as Professor Yeazell notes, the courts should, and often do, let such individuals intervene for
democratic purposes.
96. See Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir. 1968) (quoting Frankel, Amended Rule
23from a Judge's Point of View, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 295, 298 (1966): "However, the procedures
available for handling proliferated litigation, including intervention, presuppose 'a group of eco-
nomically powerful parties who are obviously able and willing to take care of their own interests
individually .... ').
97. See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 875-79 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). See also Kirkham, supra note 41, at 206; Simon, supra
note 47, at 377; Comment, supra note 30, at 878.
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2). But cf FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (requiring, for Rule 23(b)(3)
classes, individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort; individ-
ual notice is not discretionary, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974)). Although
individual responsive notice might be ideal to insure involvement, it would cripple public interest
litigation in which the plaintiffs often would be unable to afford the cost of such personalized
notice. Nor is it necessary when a representative sampling of affected individuals is notified so as
to insure presentation of all of the points of view likely to be found among this group of similarly
bituated individuals. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 306 (1950).
99. Notice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) can be continuing, but it is not required to be,
and, in practice, notice is usually not reissued.
100. See Comment, supra note 30, at 878-79.
101. See Higgenbotham, The Priority of Human Rights in Court Reform, 70 F.R.D. 134 (1976);
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1127-28 (1977); Satter, supra note 44, at
240-46.
102. See Bell, supra note 65, at 476 n.21.
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pessimistic about their potential for impact on the legal system and
may simply choose not to undergo the effort and expense of litigation.
Procedures applying equally on their face to powerful and powerless
members of society adopt the power imbalance and perpetuate its ef-
fects. 10 3 Self-stimulated participation in public interest litigation will
not ensure adequate representation of the array of affected interests
when some of those interests are uninformed as to the litigation's pro-
gress, unsophisticated as to their rights, incapable of procuring counsel,
and fatalistic about their inability to move the system to respond to
their needs. If the civil adjudication system is concerned with involving
those people who will be affected by a decision and informing itself of
their viewpoints, it must recognize that passively awaiting representa-
tive volunteers will not be effective.
The single major modification of the adversary system model, in-
tended to ameliorate the legitimacy concerns raised by public interest
litigation, has instead exacerbated them. The response to the dim per-
ception that some people absent from the litigation had interests that
might be affected was to appoint the judge as attorney for the absent
interests." The judge, however, cannot legitimately decide a case in
which he appears as an advocate.
Few judges have the time to engage in the sophisticated investigation
and discovery necessary to surface the factual information and dissent-
ing viewpoints the parties have suppressed.10 5 As a result, they most
often give conclusive presumption status to their own untested assump-
tions about the desires of a group with whom they have little contact.10 6
Yet the probability that the judge will guess correctly about the wishes
103. See Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead" Speculation on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974).
104. See, e.g., West Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ("[tlhe
cour, is responsible for the protection of the many class members whose interests are involved but
who do not appear in the action"). See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIO N, pt. I, § 1.40,
n.22, at 47 (1977); Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgements, 87
HARv. L. REv. 589 (1974).
105. See Rosenberg, Anything Legislatures Can Do, Courts Can Do Better?, 62 A.B.A.J. 587
(1976).
106. See Yeazell, Part II, supra note 38, at 1083-84, 1098. See, e.g., Ward v. Luttrell, 292 F.
Supp. 165 (E.D. La. 1968) (the judge assumed that the majority of working women in Louisiana
wanted the protection afforded by the state's female labor laws and therefore denied class certifi-
cation to representatives challenging the constitutionality of those laws). See also Ike v. North-
ern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated, 409 U.S. 815 (1972); Gray v. International
Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 73 F.R.D. 638 (D.D.C. 1977).
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of the unrepresented interests is not the most significant problem this
dual role raises. Those persons not represented by the judge may per-
ceive the system as giving the judge's "clients" an unfair advantage.
The power and influence of the judge as advocate is great. The judge
usually will agree with his own arguments, thereby undermining the
adversary system. The more important point, however, is the appear-
ance of partiality the judge's representation of absentees gives the pub-
lic generally and the affected interests in particular. The legitimacy of
the courts rests largely on the consensus that they are fair and impartial
and thus deserve voluntary respect and obedience, and they must be
careful not to undermine this trust." 7 Although the judge must be ac-
tive in seeking out and involving absent interests, he must not represent
any interest himself.
Complex parties in complex litigation contain a complex interest
structure, rarely if ever coinciding with the party structure. This inter-
est array shifts and reforms differently with each new issue to be de-
cided. Counsel, unable to represent all interests, picks one and
suppresses others. The interests thus suppressed may be unable to pre-
sent themselves to the court, leaving the process incomplete in two of
the requisites of judicial legitimacy: full participation of affected indi-
viduals and presentation of all relevant information. The judge
pragmatically cannot unearth the missing information and represent
the absent interests himself. To the extent the judge attempts this task,
he destroys his appearance of impartiality. For these reasons, the tradi-
tional adversary system has serious shortcomings when imposed on
public interest litigation.
III. THE SOLUTION: FUNCTIONAL INTEREST ANALYSIS AND
REPRESENTATION'
Though the adversary process does not work when imposed formal-
istically on modem public litigation, it contains, nevertheless, all the
elements needed to resolve the problem. Its central feature is advocacy
of opposed positions by different lawyers to a neutral judge. Tradition-
ally, the lawyers and parties choose these positions, thereby illuminat-
ing points of agreement and disagreement between them. The judge
then resolves the disagreements between the parties' positions. In com-
plex litigation, however, others who will possibly be affected, whether
107. See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
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absentees or part of a complex party, may have positions on issues that
differ from those positions presented by the lawyers for the parties.
These views should be represented as well.
Due process of law requires such representation. A person may not
be bound by litigation unless his interest has been represented.10 8 For
this reason, persons with an interest that may be pragmatically im-
paired and that is not being adequately represented may intervene as of
right. 109 Even if such persons do not intervene, they may be joined as
necessary parties. 110 The cases have made it clear that adequate repre-
sentation of an interest means advocacy for the outcome preference of
the individual.
In Hansberry v. Lee,'1 in which the binding effect of an earlier class
action was in question, the Supreme Court focused on the advocacy
goal of the purported representative. It looked to whether the class rep-
resentative had sought the same result as would the individual who was
supposedly bound. The earlier class representative had wanted the
Court to hold the restrictive covenant in question valid; the individual
in the current case wanted it found invalid. Because the outcome
desires or positions of the two were not the same, even though the par-
ties factually were similarly situated as landowners, the individual was
not bound." 2 His interest or outcome position was not adequately
represented.
It is clear that the touchstone for due process cannot be factual simi-
larity between the representative and the individual. Rather, it is the
representative's, advocacy for the position or outcome desired by the
individual. Therefore, in all litigation, and particularly in litigation
seeking an injunction or involving complex parties, the court must en-
sure that the outcome positions of everyone affected, be they absentees
or individuals technically subsumed within a formal party, are ade-
quately represented.
This requirement of advocacy will not necessarily complicate the liti-
108. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973).
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
111. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
112. Perhaps the earliest proponent of this principle was Frederick Calvert, who asserted that
one of the conditions for representative litigation was that the representative party "shall have an
interest not merely in the property in question, but in the object of the suit." F. CALVERT, A
TREATISE UPON THE LAW RESPECTING PARTIES TO SUITS IN EQUITY *32, quotedin Yeazell, Part
II, supra note 38, at 1083.
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gation for two reasons: only significantly affected interests need be rep-
resented, and the number of outcomes may be no greater, or may even
be fewer, than the number of parties.
Interests touched only incidentally have never had the right of repre-
sentation in a lawsuit. The 1966 amendment to the federal intervention
rule eliminated the need for the intervenor to show that the suit will
have a legally binding effect on his interest. It substituted instead a
provision requiring the intervenor to show the practical impairment of
his interest. a13 Cases since have interpreted that standard liberally." 4
Nonetheless, a significant rather than minor effect is still necessary.
Whenever a governmental agency is sued, all taxpayers are affected, at
least to the extent that they pay a small portion of the litigation expense
and possibly the cost of bureaucratic reorganization. Further, the ex-
penses of corporate reorganization are passed into the economy and
affect a wide range of individuals. This sort of indirect or attenuated
impact does not require consideration in the litigation, however. For
an interest to be involved in the litigation, the potential impact on the
interest should be direct, substantial, and special rather than tangential,
minor, or general in scope.
Individuals significantly affected by the litigation are not entitled
necessarily to individual participation through counsel. Due process
requires only that their position be adequately represented. Each indi-
vidual who may be affected by the decision must have a representative
presenting evidence and arguments seeking to persuade the judge to
decide the issue in the way desired by that individual. 1 5 The number
of representative advocates required on any particular issue is limited,
however, by the number of outcome possibilities supported by any of
the affected individuals. Thus, if a particular question has four possible
resolutions, and of the 100 affected individuals, 60 prefer one outcome,
30 the second, 10 the third, and none prefer the fourth, then three advo-
cates are required. One will advocate the first outcome, representing 60
individuals; another will advocate the second outcome, representing 30;
and the third will advocate the third result, representing 10. No advo-
113. See Advisory Comm. Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 109 (1966).
114. See Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967); Atlantis
Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967).
115. The representation of an interest essentially consists of presenting the facts and argu-
ments that interest would wish presented to support its desired result. See Ford Motor Co. v.
Bisanz Bros., 249 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1957).
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cate is necessary for the fourth result because no individuals prefer it.
Thus, the 100 affected individuals would all be adequately represented
by the three outcome-oriented advocates. 1 6 That a complex party may
have a division of interest within it and that an individual's outcome
interest may be advocated by the lawyer for another party are unim-
portant, as long as each outcome interest is advocated.
Dierks v. Thompson I" is an excellent example of functional aterest
analysis that simplified the litigation rather than complicating it. That
case involved a dispute between employees and a corporation as to the
interpretation of a pension plan. The lawyer for the class of plaintiff
employees represented one outcome interest, and the corporation de-
fendant advocated the other. The corporation opposed class certifica-
tion, however, arguing that the plaintiff class contained a conflict of
views and that the lawyer for the class could not adequately represent
the divided group. Among the employees, a substantial group favored
each interpretation of the plan. One remedy for this problem would
have been to create a subclass and have two class lawyers, one for each
outcome oriented subclass-making a total of three lawyers arguing
two positions. This was entirely unnecessary, however. The employ-
ees' two conflicting interests were both adequately represented in the
litigation, because the outcomes they desired were both being advo-
cated by the two parties' counsel. The plaintiff group presented all the
facts and arguments favoring its interpretation of the plan after con-
sulting the collective knowledge and imagination of its constituency,
those workers who favored its interpretation. Under the adversary the-
ory, the corporate defendant presented all facts and arguments favoring
its interpretation, drawing on its constituents, including the officers, di-
rectors, stockholders, and employees who were on its side. Due process
of law was satisfied, and a functional analysis of the interests allowed
the court to proceed with two lawyers rather than three.118
116. The court should not, of course, bow to the wishes of the majority simply because most of
the affected interests prefer that position. The nature of public interest litigation is often
nondemocratic, see note 101 supra; its function is to protect minority rights from the majority,
even the majority of the minority. If the court decides that the position of the 10% group best
protects the rights involved, it should so find. See United States v. Michigan, 460 F. Supp. 637,
639 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
117. 414 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1969).
118. See also Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Smith v. Swormstedt,
57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1854); and the discussion of these cases in Yeazell, Part I1, supra note 38,
at 1104-05.
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The first rule of functional interest analysis, then, is that the outcome
position, not the formal party, requires representation.' 19 This leads to
a second rule: the interest array, and hence the advocacy, changes with
each new decision to be made. Traditionally, when a lawyer represents
a party in litigation, the same lawyers represent the same parties
throughout the litigation, because the party structure is relatively static.
In complex litigation, however, particularly during the remedy building
process, the variety of choices and the large numbers of individuals
affected should alert the court to expect changes in the positions of in-
dividuals as the litigation progresses.
Through the course of the litigation there may be a large variety of
interests within each complex party and among absentees and interest
groupings that cross party lines. At any point in the litigation, how-
ever, the interest groupings may be seen as limited by the number of
possible outcomes on the issue then being considered. In the liability
stage, when the choice is bipolar, there are two interest groups, but in
the remedy stage, when the choices are multiple, there may be multiple
interest groups.
Rather than satisfying itself with an initial determination of ade-
quacy of representation, the court should repeat the analysis of interests
each time a new issue is to be decided. Inquiry into the interest array in
public interest litigation must continue from the liability to the remedy
phase, from an initial concern with whether the parties agree on the
desirability of liability being found to an examination of the prefer-
ences of various individuals who will be affected by the available reme-
dial choices. It is clear that the test of adequate representation of an
absent individual's interest is outcome oriented. The court, therefore,
must recognize that the outcome of public interest litigation is not con-
cluded with the liability phase, but is largely dependent on the array of
interests afforded advocacy in the remedy phase.
The third rule of functional interest analysis and advocacy is that the
individuals who may be affected and whose positions are being repre-
sented must be actively involved in the lawsuit and must have a mecha-
119. It may at first seem heretical to propose that formal parties are not entitled to have their
own counsel present evidence and argument to the court, but instead may be forced to rely on the
services of someone else's lawyer if he advocates the same position. Yet this is precisely the effect
of the use of lead counsel, which is common in complex litigation. Thus the MANUAL FOR COM-
PLEX LITIGATION, pt. I, §§ 1.90-.92, 4.53 (1977), provides for the judge to appoint lead counsel, to
conduct the litigation on behalf of numerous formal parties with their own several lawyers. As
long as their position is adequately represented, they have no right to individual participation.
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nism for information and idea exchange with their outcome oriented
representative. The court should not passively wait for the people af-
fected by a case to intervene because they may never show up. Rather,
it should actively seek their participation and views.120 The affected
individuals will comply more readily with the decree if their views have
been solicited, and the court will better be able to decide an issue if
it is presented with all pertinent information. If the advocates have
access to the knowledge of all affected individuals, rather than just
that of their formal client, they can better formulate their advocacy
presentation. 121
In obtaining information as well as organizing the interest groupings
for advocacy, the court and the lawyers should solicit direct expression
from the affected individuals rather than relying on their own untested
assumptions about the absentees' desires. The court should distribute
frequent notice defining the issues under consideration and inviting re-
sponse. This "sampling notice"12 2 should be given in a manner
designed to evoke a response from a representative sampling of the af-
fected individuals. Polls or questionnaires may also be used to obtain
necessary information and expressions of desired results. Special mas-
ters may be used to investigate what outcome positions are held by
those who may be affected. | 23
Once the court has determined the various outcome positions on an
issue, it should insure that a lawyer, be it a party's counsel or an amicus
curiae, is assigned to represent each position."2 4 The judge should not
represent any position himself, because that undercuts the perceived
impartiality of the court. Finally, the court should notify the affected
individuals of which lawyer is representing which position so that the
individuals may communicate with their representative. The lawyer, of
120. See Note, supra note 30, at 440.
121. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 101 S. Ct. 2193 (1981) (communication between counsel and
class members helpful to notify class members of lawsuit, to assist them in making choices relating
to lawsuit, and to obtain information relating to merits of lawsuit may not be prohibited absent
finding of potential abuse).
122. "Sampling notice" seeks a response from the recipient indicating, for example, his pre-
ferred outcome to a litigation issue. See generally 7A C. WRIrr & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE & PROCEDURE § 1793 (1972). See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, pt. I, § 1.45
(1977).
123. See Wilton, supra note 71, for a more detailed discussion of techniques to obtain infor-
mation from and involve the absentees who may be affected. See also Comment, supra note 30, at
881-83, 907-09.
124. See Comment, supra note 30, at 907-08./
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course, should investigate and communicate with the individuals who
support his position to discover what information and arguments they
have that may assist his advocacy.
Through this method of functional interest analysis and investiga-
tion, the court will obtain a more accurate assessment of the identity of
the significantly affected individuals and of their preferred outcome po-
sitions, rather than the distorted view the party structure yields. As
long as each outcome position is advocated by counsel with access to
his constituents' information, each individual is adequately repre-
sented. By inviting communication between the lawyer and the indi-
viduals and defining the advocate's constituency to accurately coincide
with his goal, the system increases the fairness of the process.
Application of these principles to two of the cases discussed above,
the Airline Stewards caseI25 and the Ann Arbor "Black English" case,' 26
will illustrate their operation.
Both cases are typical of modem public litigation: they have only
two sides in the liability phase but are more complex in the remedy
phase of the litigation. Thus, in the Airline Stewards case, the issue
initially was the legality of the rule on firing pregnant stewardesses.
Only two positions were possible: either the rule was legitimate or it
was not. The litigation already had a lawyer advocating each of these
positions. At this point, having ensured that the outcome positions
were all represented, the court should have issued notice to the poten-
tially affected individuals, encouraging them to communicate any in-
formation they considered helpful to the advocate for their position.
Even on the issue of legality, stewards or stewardesses possibly could
find it in their interest to support upholding the rule127 and could have
factual information that would serve to justify it. 2 ' They should be
encouraged to supply this information not to the lawyer who represents
the union, the party of which they are a technical part, but to the com-
pany's lawyer, who advocates their outcome oriented interest. The
union's lawyer probably would suppress the information because it
125. See notes 58-60 supra and accompanying text.
126. See notes 89-94 supra and accompanying text.
127. Stewards and stewardesses who do not intend to become pregnant, for example, might
find the rule to be in their interest because they will advance in relative seniority more quickly if
their pregnant co-workers are fired.
128. One can speculate on just what this information might be. There is no report in the case
of such information, because the dissenting stewards and stewardesses had no representative to
channel this information to the judge.
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harms his case, but the company's lawyer may use the information.
The judge will thus be more fully informed. Similarly, the corporation
may contain people who oppose the firing rule and have factual infor-
mation that undercuts its justification. They, too, should be en-
couraged to communicate not with their formal representative, the
company's lawyer, but with their functional representative, the lawyer
who will advocate their position of opposition to the rule, even though
he is employed by the union.' 29
Assuming the court finds liability and proceeds to the remedy, a new
and more complex analysis of interests becomes necessary. Outcome
positions on each issue must be determined, and the individuals who
support each position must be aligned with the advocate for that posi-
tion. Thus, on the seniority issue, two basic outcome positions are
readily identified: either the improperly fired stewardesses should have
seniority credit restored or they should not. In addition, however, some
individuals may believe the stewardesses should receive some but not
all seniority credit, or that some but not all stewardesses should receive
seniority credit. If these individuals have specific legal reasons for their
position, they may compose another outcome position requiring advo-
cacy. If, however, their position is meant to constitute a compromise
between the two basic positions, then their group will not require a
separate advocate. The correct compromise between the two positions
will be achieved by advocacy of each of the two basic positions accord-
ing to adversary theory.' 30
Thus, depending on the views held by the individuals concerned,
129. There is no legal rule prohibiting such communication, but neither is there any rule or
practice encouraging it. In the absence of information about its propriety, most individuals proba-
bly are afraid to initiate communication with the lawyer for the opposing party, even if they agree
with his position.
130. For example, one might take the position that stewardesses who were fired or resigned
with some formal protest should have seniority restored, while those whose resignations appar-
ently were voluntary should not, because the causal link between the rule and their termination is
tenuous. This is a position based on law, a basic outcome position requiring advocacy. One might
take the position that the stewardesses should get back seniority less one year, the approximate
period of time they would not be working because of maternity leave. Again, there is an in-
dependent reason for this outcome position, and it should have an advocate if it is supported by
any of the affected individuals. On the other hand, one might take the position that the airlines
and the stewardesses were both partly at fault and that they should compromise and as compensa-
tion give the stewardesses some seniority but not all. This is a compromise position, one that is
between the basic positions but cannot stand on its own. Advocacy for such a position would
simply draw from arguments for each of the basic positions, but would present no new arguments
or evidence of its own. Functionally, then, such advocacy is redundant and unnecessary. Only
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their outcome preferences, and the reasons for them, there may be two,
three, four, or perhaps even more outcome positions requiring advo-
cacy. The court or a special master can make this determination by
sampling notice, polls, or even by a hearing. The question then be-
comes one of where to get the advocates for each position.
The union lawyer's natural constituency probably opposes the ac-
crual of seniority by the fired stewardesses.13 1 The company, through
its lawyer, may have no position at all or may oppose it as well.132 If it
has no preference on the issue, it may retire from this particular fight,
for it would be unfair to require a party to support and pay an attorney
to advocate a position in which it has no interest. 3 3 If both lawyers
oppose accrual of seniority, then one must be primarily responsible for
presenting that position. The two counsel may agree on which of them
will be lead counsel for the position or, if they cannot agree, the court
should designate lead counsel.' 34 Advocacy for the other position or
positions, those not represented by the parties' counsel, must be sup-
plied by appointed counsel. 35
primary positions require advocacy; the test for a primary position is whether it is likely to present
new evidence or legal argument.
131. See note 59 supra.
132. If seniority determines only who gets what routes, the airlines may not care about back
seniority. If salary increases are tied to seniority, however, the airlines may oppose it.
133. On the other hand, because attorney fees in these cases are often awarded to the prevail-
ing party and taxed as costs against the losing party, see note 135 infra, it would not be inappropri-
ate for the court to employ the losing party's counsel as advocate for a position when the party
itself has no outcome preference. The court must ensure, however, that the advocacy for the
position is vigorous and the advocate's loyalty is undivided. Thus, the court should not ask coun-
sel to advocate a position opposed to the outcome preference of his employer and should weigh
carefully whether to ask counsel to advocate a position when his employer has no preference, lest
the advocacy be less than vigorous.
134. This is the procedure suggested by the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, pt. I,
1.90-.93, 4.53 (1977).
135. It is not unlikely that a list of counsel willing to undertake such interest representation on
apro bono basis could be compiled and would be extensive. See Miller, Frankenstein Monsters,
supra note 38, at 675; Miller, Overview, supra note 38, at 213. Indeed, the Court could simply
appoint counsel on an uncompensated basis if it wished without waiting for volunteers, though
this might result in half-hearted advocacy. See Note, Court 4ppointment of Attorneys in Civil
Cases: The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 366 (1981).
Fees for appointed counsel, should the interests be unable to hire counsel, and shouldpro bono
counsel be unobtainable, may come from several sources. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976) provides
for appointment of counsel in Title VII cases. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 340 v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 373, 376 (D. Kan. 1971). Counsel fees may be awarded, for exam-
ple, to the prevailing party in an action to enforce certain federal civil rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1976), or voting rights, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (1976) (and "prevailing party" may be liberally inter-
preted), or to any party in a citizen suit to enforce federal water pollution standards, 33 U.S.C.
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On the back pay issue, the company's lawyer is undoubtedly in op-
position and can represent that position. In light of the company's in-
transigence on the issue, the union's lawyer probably would like to see
the issue settled quickly, so the fired stewardesses can obtain reinstate-
ment, but does not care particularly how it is settled. t36 The few stew-
ardesses who are entitled to back pay, however, create a third position,
one unrepresented in the litigation. They, too, should be represented,
and their interest should not be compromised without advocacy. Yet,
because they seek money and can probably obtain private counsel, the
court need not appoint counsel for this interest. The judge should no-
tify those who may be entitled to back pay that the issue is in litigation
and should invite them to hire counsel and intervene, either individu-
ally or as subclass. If, in the end, several lawyers represent the position,
one of them must serve as lead counsel. If none of these individuals
intervenes, due process still has been satisfied, for they had notice and
an opportunity to respond.
In the Black English case, the initial issue was the liability of the
Board under the federal statute prohibiting racial discrimination in
schools by failing to respond to a student's language barrier. 137 Two
positions were obvious, and, the parties' lawyers represented both. The
problem was, however, that the lawyers were aligned with the formal
parties rather than with the individuals who supported their positions.
The judge should have required broad notice to all who might have
been affected, informing them of each advocate's position and inviting
communication with the advocate who represented their view.
Many individual members of the defendant entity supported plain-
tiff's position on liability.13 8 Their information might have been help-
ful in deciding the issue, and they should have been encouraged to
contact plaintiffs lawyers. Among plaintiffs, on the other hand, none
§ 1365 (1976). See generally Note, Promoting the Vindication of CivilRtghts Through treAttorneys'
Fees Awards Act, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1980); Note, Awards of0Attorneys' Fees to Legal Aid
Offices, 87 H~v. L. REv. 411 (1973). Numerous other statutes also provide for the award of
attorney's fees in specific types of cases. Counsel may be paid from the group damage award
should one be obtained. See Dawson, supra note 28. Even if counsel fees are not payable or
recoverable by some party, however, it is appropriate that counsel for otherwise unrepresented
interests be paid from public funds, because his representation is essential to a fair and just judi-
cial decision and is truly in the public interest. Because much of this work is now being done by
judges, and because counsel would be paid less than a judge, this suggestion is economic in the
long run.
136. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
137. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(0 (1976).
138. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
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supported defendant's position, because this was an individual, not
class, action. Had the plaintiff group been a class, it is not inconceiv-
able that some plaintiff class members might have supported the de-
fendant on liability. Because the plaintiff group was not a class,
however, many persons who might have been affected, such as the
other students and their parents, not only in the King School, but in all
Ann Arbor schools, were not included in the formal party structure. 139
Formal individual notice to all these people was not necessary, but
some form of group notice should have been supplied, coupled perhaps
with a direct mailing to a group large enough to obtain a representative
sampling of views. In this way the affected individuals could have been
fully involved, and the judge could have made his decision after advo-
cacy by lawyers with access to the full range of information supporting
their positions.
After liability was found in this case, a complex remedial program
had to be prepared. The judge wisely ordered the party defendant to
prepare the program. Unwisely, he did no more to involve all the af-
fected individuals. Many judges in complex litigation who recognize
the difficulty of enforcing such a remedial scheme on a daily basis be-
lieve it is necessary to give the defendant a stake in the plan's success.
If the defendant entity designs the plan for its own restructuring, it will
be more likely to enforce the plan itself.140 The flaw in this reasoning,
however, is that when the defendant is a complex bureaucracy, the de-
signers of the plan are rarely the ones who must carry it out. In the
Black English case, for example, the superintendent and his staff
designed the plan, but the teachers were responsible for its success or
failure. The teachers in many respects were not consulted about the
creation of the plan. They had little incentive, therefore, to work for its
success.
When the judge ordered the defendant entity to prepare the plan, he
should also have ordered that the various affected interests, particularly
teachers, parents, and children, be consulted and involved. More im-
portantly, after the plan was prepared, he should have invited the indi-
viduals who would be affected to make comments and alternative
139. The case had a direct effect only on the King School The remedial plan, however, could
easily be extended to all other schools in Ann Arbor, either voluntarily as the administration
recommended or by pro forma litigation, because collateral estoppel would bind the school board.
See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
140. See Chayes, supra note 24, at 1298-1301; Comment, supra note 30, at 809-12; Note, supra
note 30, at 432-40.
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suggestions. This could be done through general notice, sampling no-
tice, and polls. From this process, specific alternatives on, particular
aspects of the plan could be developed, advocates for each could be
assigned, and a full adversary presentation, if necessary, could be
made.
In reality, only plaintiffs' counsel presented opposing suggestions to
the proposed plan, all of which were rejected without further investiga-
tion by the judge. If the individuals affected by the case had been
polled, however, it would have become clear that there was substantial,
even overwhelming, support among the teachers for plaintiffs' version
of several plan features. 141 This would certainly have helped the advo-
cacy of plaintiffs' counsel, if it had been necessary. Most likely, how-
ever, the defendant would simply have agreed to plaintiffs' proposals
on these points, because they were supported strongly by the constitu-
ent members of the defendant group. No one bothered to ask the
teachers directly what they preferred. Everyone assumed they pre-
ferred the superintendent's plan.
Functional interest analysis, involvement, and advocacy in each of
these cases would have resulted in a fairer decision making process.
The holdings in the cases, the decisions themselves, might have been no
different. The cases would have been more effective, however, because
the people who ultimately had to be satisfied, those who must abide by
the decree, would have thought that the process by which the judicial
system made the decisions* affecting their lives was a fair process, one
deserving of respect and obedience.
The current adversary party organization and representation of in-
terests is ineffective to ensure that people who are affected by modem
public litigation will have their views heard through a representative
advocate. The active solicitation of involvement of individuals who
may be affected, and the organization of their views into outcome posi-
tions for advocacy, efficiently promotes the true policies of the adver-
sary system. It results in a more fully informed decision by the judge
and in a public more satisfied that the judicial process is fair and just.
This public confidence in the fairness of the judicial process is crucial
because it ensures voluntary compliance with the remedial scheme.
Functional interest advocacy, therefore, is essential to enhance the le-
gitimacy and effectiveness of the judicial system in modem complex
litigation.
141. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
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